Technical Disclosure Commons
Defensive Publications Series
January 2021

Automatic Sanitization of Use-After-Free Pointers
Kentaro Hara

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series

Recommended Citation
Hara, Kentaro, "Automatic Sanitization of Use-After-Free Pointers", Technical Disclosure Commons,
(January 04, 2021)
https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/3932

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Technical Disclosure Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Defensive Publications Series by an authorized administrator of Technical Disclosure Commons.

Hara: Automatic Sanitization of Use-After-Free Pointers

Automatic Sanitization of Use-After-Free Pointers
ABSTRACT
When the memory for an object is deallocated, pointers to that object become invalid.
Such pointers, known as dangling pointers, can be exploited by attackers to cause undesirable or
malicious program behavior. A pointer that points to memory that has been reused (reallocated)
is known as a use-after-free pointer; these, too, are gateways to exploits. This disclosure
describes techniques to track pointers in runtime and periodically test pointers to determine if
they are pointing to deallocated or reallocated memory regions. Upon the discovery of pointers
pointing to deallocated or reallocated memory, security breaches are forestalled by causing a
program crash accompanied by a bug report.
KEYWORDS
● Dangling pointer
● Use-after-free sanitization
● Use-after-free memory
● Use-after-free attack
● Memory management
● Memory leak
BACKGROUND
When the memory for an object is deallocated, pointers to that object become invalid.
Such pointers, known as dangling pointers, can be exploited by attackers to cause undesirable or
malicious program behavior. A pointer that points to memory that has been reused (reallocated)
is known as a use-after-free pointer; these, too, are gateways to exploits.

Published by Technical Disclosure Commons, 2021

2

Defensive Publications Series, Art. 3932 [2021]

DESCRIPTION
This disclosure describes techniques that track pointers at runtime and periodically test
them for pointing to deallocated or reallocated memory regions. Upon discovery of pointers
pointing to deallocated (or reallocated) memory, security breaches are forestalled by causing a
program crash, which may be preferable to leaving open the potential for security breaches. The
program crash is accompanied by a bug report, which enables the efficient debugging of memory
errors that are often difficult to debug.
Per the techniques, a new pointer type, SafePtr<T>, is defined as follows.
template <T>
class SafePtr {
T* raw_;
// The pointer to the target object.
SafePtrSlots* slot_; // The slot on which the SafePtr is stored.
}
SafePtr objects are stored in a linked-list (or array) of slots referred to as SafePtrSlots.

Within a SafePtr object, the member raw_* is a pointer to the target object, while the member
slot_ is a pointer to the slot within SafePtrSlots in which the SafePtr object is stored.

Fig. 1: A SafePtr object and its tracking mechanism, SafePtrSlots

Fig. 1 illustrates a SafePtr object and its tracking mechanism, e.g., the linked-list of slots
known as SafePtrSlots. The SafePtr object occupies a certain position (second, in this
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example) in the linked-list of slots and comprises two members, one of which, raw_, is a pointer
to a target object, and another, slot_, points to the address of the SafePtr object.
class SomeObject {
T* ptr_;
};

(a)

class SomeObject {
SafePtr<T> ptr_;
};

(b)

Fig. 2: Enabling SafePtrs. (a) code with ordinary pointers (b) code with SafePtrs

Fig. 2 illustrates the use of SafePtrs in code. In place of ordinary pointers as shown in
Fig. 2(a), a programmer simply uses SafePtrs as shown in Fig. 2(b). There is no other change,
e.g., no change in the implementation language. Ordinary pointers can be globally replaced by
SafePtrs. As any class is, SafePtrs are instantiated by their constructors and deallocated by

their destructors. A SafePtr constructor grants space at the head of the SafePtrSlots to the
SafePtr object being instantiated. Similarly, a SafePtr destructor returns to the free list the slot

that was occupied by the SafePtr object.
Additionally, upon the destruction or deallocation of a target object, the memory region
once occupied by the target object is poisoned, e.g., written over with a fixed hexadecimal
number such as (typically) 0xBADC0DE, and a pointer to the deallocated memory region moved to
a pending list. Dereferencing a SafePtr that points to memory in the pending list causes a
program crash.
Furthermore, when the size of the pending list reaches some threshold, a sanitizer is
triggered using a concurrent thread. The concurrent sanitizer iterates over all SafePtrs in the
SafePtrSlots list. A SafePtr still found to be pointing to the pending list is identified as a use-

after-free pointer. The existence of a use-after-free pointer triggers a process crash.
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Since memory regions in the pending list are filled with 0xBADC0DE, sanitization can be
done using a member function such as the following.
SafePtr::Sanitize() {
if (UNLIKELY(raw_ && *raw_ == 0xBADC0DE)) {
// raw_ is likely to be pointing to the pending list.
if (InPendingList(raw_)) {
CRASH();
}
}
}

If no use-after-free pointer is found, the concurrent sanitizer unpoisons the pending list
and moves the pending list to the free list.
In this manner, the techniques of this disclosure forestall security breaches due to
dangling or use-after-free pointers by modifying the memory allocator to deterministically
protect ordinary (raw) pointers, and by causing a program crash upon the detection of user-afterfree pointers. The techniques require little memory overhead (one word per SafePtr, plus space
for the pending list and SafePtrSlots) and have little runtime overhead (SafePtr construction,
destruction, and periodic sanitization). The cost of dereferencing a SafePtr is nearly the same as
the cost of dereferencing an ordinary pointer.
The described techniques can be implemented in software such as browsers, operating
systems, etc.
CONCLUSION
This disclosure describes techniques to track pointers in runtime and periodically test
pointers to determine if they are pointing to deallocated or reallocated memory regions. Upon the
discovery of pointers pointing to deallocated or reallocated memory, security breaches are
forestalled by causing a program crash accompanied by a bug report.
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